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Sam Cosaert* omas Demuynck†
Abstract
In this paper, we combine elementary revealed preference principles and nonparametric
estimation techniques in order to obtain nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the
money metric utility over a population of heterogeneous households. e main beneﬁt of
our approach is that it is independent of any functional speciﬁcation on the household utility
functions, whichmeans that our results are robust against parametric speciﬁcation errors. We
further demonstrate that our methodology can be used to establish bounds on the distribu-
tion of the demand function for counterfactual price regimes. In order to demonstrate the
relevance of our approach, we illustrate our ﬁndings using a repeated cross–sectional house-
hold consumption data set.
JEL-codes: D12, C14
Keywords: unobserved heterogeneity, stochastic revealed preference, household demand
1 Introduction
is paper presents a framework to construct nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the
money metric utility function while taking into account individual unobserved heterogeneity.
Our approach combines elementary revealed preference concepts (in particular the Weak Ax-
iom of Revealed Preference) with nonparametric (kernel) estimation techniques. In this man-
ner, our approach remains independent of any parametric speciﬁcation on the underlying house-
hold utility functions or on the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. We further demonstrate
how the framework can be used to establish bounds on the distribution of the demand functions
in counterfactual price regimes. An illustration using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a US
cross–sectional household consumption data set demonstrates the practical usefulness of our re-
sults.
*K.U.Leuven, E.Sabbelaan 53, 8500 Kortrijk, Belgium, email: sam.cosaert@kuleuven.be
†Corresponding author, Maastricht University, Tongersestraat 53, 6711 LM Maastricht, Netherlands, email:
t.demuynck@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1
Motivation Demand analysis provides a powerful tool to analyse behavioural responses and
welfare eﬀects due to price and income variations. In a typical demand study, the researcher ﬁrst
estimates the parameters of some parametric demand system,1 and subsequently uses these es-
timates to calculate the associated indirect utilities. is ‘parametric’ approach has two major
shortcomings. e ﬁrst shortcoming results from the fact that the outcome is sensitive to the
speciﬁc functional structure chosen by the researcher. Imposing the wrong functional form can
therefore severely bias the resulting analysis. e second shortcoming is that it treats the problem
of individual (unobserved) heterogeneity in an very add-hoc manner. In a typical consumer data
set, we observe individuals or households only once. Given this data limitation, it is oen assumed
that similar looking individuals have similar preferences. Many demand studies therefore model
a household’s demand to equal a rational systematic component, from a common utility function
across all (similar looking) households, and a household speciﬁc additive error term capturing
the unobserved heterogeneity or taste variation. By controlling for various observable charac-
teristics (like household size), it is hoped that the issue of heterogeneity across the households is
adequately addressed by including such additive error term. However, this assumption disregards
the ﬁnding that individuals who look very similar may actually diﬀer dramatically in their actual
choice behaviour.2 Moreover, as Lewbel (2001) showed, imposing additivity of the unobserved
heterogeneity is a strong assumption whose implications come very close to enforcing a represen-
tative agent assumption.3 To summarize, we see that diﬀerent people (although they may look
the same) have diﬀerent tastes and, consequentially, behave diﬀerently. In order to take this into
account, it is crucial to allow for non-additive unobserved heterogeneity.
Literature overview In order to deal with aforementioned two problems, one can distinguish
between two approaches. e ﬁrst approach looks at the nonparametric diﬀerential ‘smooth’ re-
striction that can still be established in a heterogeneous population. ese usually take the form
of population level generalizations of Slutsky symmetry, negativity and homogeneity. Recent ex-
amples that follow this approach are Hoderlein (2011), Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey (2013),
Hausman and Newey (2013), and Hoderlein and Vanhems (2013). A second approach, which is
the one followed in this paper, is to rely on revealed preference theory. Revealed preference theory
was initiated by Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and further developed in several seminal
contributions by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). emain aim of revealed pref-
erences theory is to establish (combinatorial) restrictions on observed demand behaviour of a
certain individual or household such that it is consistent with the classical model of utility max-
imization subject to a budget constraint. One of its main advantages is that it imposes no func-
tional restrictions on the underlying utility function, except for some regularity conditions like
local non-satiation.
Revealed preference theory, as it was initially developed has two main problems. First, from
1Popular parametric demand systems are the Translog (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1975), the Almost Ideal
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), or the Quadratic Almost Ideal (Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel, 1997) demand system.
2Unobserved heterogeneity is oen seen as an main reason why demand estimations on cross sectional data typ-
ically have low r-squared values.
3See also Brown andWalker (1989) andMcElroy (1987) for a discussion of other issues when taking into account
unobserved heterogeneity in demand analysis.
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an empirical point of view, the method does not really seem to provide very tight bounds. e
main reason for this is that relative price variations usually tend to be quite small in comparison
to income variation. is implies that budget hyperplanes oen do not cross. We refer to Bronars
(1987) and Varian (1982) for a discussion of this problem. e second problem is that revealed
preference theory is not well suited to deal with unobserved individual heterogeneity. As a result,
most of its applications remain conﬁned to a few panel consumption data sets, where the same
household or individual is observed over multiple periods.
e ﬁrst problem has been the subject of several recent studies that apply revealed preference
theory to repeated cross sectional data by combining insights from revealed preference theory
with nonparametric estimation techniques (see Blundell (2005); Blundell, Browning, and Craw-
ford (2003, 2007, 2008) and Blundell, Browning, Cherchye, Crawford, De Rock, and Vermeulen
(2012)). e main contribution from this literature is that it shows how to use nonparametric
Engel curve demand estimates as an input for revealed preference analysis. If we assume that
households in the same time period and location face the same relative prices, then the non-
parametric Engel curves estimate the mean (or average) expansion paths for each price regime.
e availability of these expansion paths greatly improves the nonparametric bounds on various
welfare related concepts and on the counterfactual demand estimates that can be obtained using
revealed preference techniques.
A remaining drawback of this approach is the way it deals with the issue of unobserved hetero-
geneity. Given that the Engel curve estimates are obtained from a mean regression, the method-
ology is subject to Lewbel (2001)’s critique in the sense that imposing revealed preference restric-
tions on the mean Engel curve estimates comes very close to imposing a representative consumer
assumption. Given this, the approach does not fully address the individual heterogeneity prob-
lem. Moreover, despite the fact that the procedure has the potential to produce tight bounds on the
‘representative’ money metric utility and demand functions, it does not give us any information
concerning the distribution of these functions across the heterogeneous population.
A useful extension of revealed preference theory that explicitly takes into account individ-
ual heterogeneity is Stochastic Revealed Preference eory, initiated by McFadden and Richter
(1971) and Falmagne (1978).4 We refer to McFadden (2005) for an overview of the literature.
Stochastic revealed preference takes as input the entire distribution of demand behaviour over a
heterogeneous population of households for a ﬁnite number of budget sets.5 erefore, it is well
suited to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. e literature has put forward sev-
eral rationality axioms (e.g. the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference and the Weak Axiom of
Stochastic Revealed Preference) that provide conditions on the distributions of choices such that
a population of individuals are consistent with rational choice theory, which postulates that in-
dividuals are preference maximizers. Although the literature is mainly theoretical, several recent
papers have started to develop statistical tests to verify whether the stochastic revealed preference
axioms are satisﬁed in reality. Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) derive a statistical procedure to in-
4See also Block and Marschak (1959), McFadden (1975), Fishburn (1978), Cohen (1980), Barberá and Pattanaik
(1986), Fishburn and Falmagne (1989), Cohen and Falmagne (1990), Fishburn (1992), Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta,
and Pattanaik (1999) for other contributions.
5A second interpretation of stochastic revealed preference theory is that the demand behaviour is generated by a
single household with a random utility function.
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fer bounds on the fraction of the population that violate the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed
Preference. Kitamura and Stoye (2013) derive a statistical test to verify whether a population of
heterogeneous households satisﬁes the Axiomof Stochastic Revealed Preference for a ﬁnite collec-
tion of budget sets, thereby explicitly taking into account that preferences are transitive. Finally,
Kawaguchi (2012) derives several procedures to test the validity of various axioms of revealed
stochastic preference. Interestingly, these studies ﬁnd little evidence that the stochastic revealed
preference restrictions are violated. e main diﬀerence between these papers and ours is the fo-
cus. While above mentioned contributions mainly deal with testing whether the axioms imposed
by the stochastic revealed preference literature hold, we aremore interested in the restrictions that
these axioms impose on the resulting distribution of the money metric utility and demand func-
tions. In the terminology of Varian (1982); while above papers deal with the testing of a theory,
we concentrate on the recovery of the underlying structure of the model.
Also closely related to our paper is the recent paper of Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin
(2011). ese authors focus on the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in a two goods setting. In
particular, they tackle the problem of individual unobserved heterogeneity by using nonparamet-
ric quantile demand estimates in combination with standard revealed preference tests (i.e. SARP).
In this respect, Stoye and Hoderlein (2013) recently showed that in a two goods setting, imposing
the usual revealed preference axioms on the quantile demands is equivalent to imposing the Ax-
iom of Stochastic Revealed Preference on the entire data set.6 Unfortunately, their methodology
is not easily extendible to a setting with more than two goods, whereas our analysis requires no
limitation on the number of goods under consideration.
Contribution emain contribution of this paper to derive nonparametric bounds on themoney
metric utility functions and the demand functions without imposing any functional structure on
the household utility functions and under very weak requirements on the unobserved heterogene-
ity structure. As such, we avoid the problem that our results might be biased because of a wrong
functional speciﬁcation or because the households do not satisfy the ‘representative agent’ condi-
tion. We establish our results by combining elementary stochastic revealed preference theory and
nonparametric estimation techniques. Our framework not only allows us to derive bounds on the
mean of the money metric utility and demand functions, but on the entire distribution of these
functions over the heterogeneous population. is provides important additional information
concerning the distribution of welfare and demand over the population.
In order to obtain our results, we exploit the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP)
applied to a population of heterogeneous households. Although this axiom is weaker than the
revealed preference axioms that exploit transitivity (e.g. the StrongAxiomofRevealed Preference),
we nevertheless show that it is powerful enough to establish narrow bounds. We demonstrate the
usefulness of our results by applying it to the Consumer Expenditure survey, a US cross sectional
consumption data set.
6e analysis is greatly simpliﬁed by the fact that in a two goods setting, theWeak Axiom of (Stochastic) Revealed
Preference coincides with the Strong Axiom of (Stochastic) Revealed Preference , i.e. imposing transitivity implies no
additional testable implications, see Rose (1958).
4
Outline In section two, we set out our framework and we present the necessary notation, con-
cepts and deﬁnitions for the remaining part of the paper. Section 3 establishes the theoretical
results that provide the bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility function and the
demand functions. Section 4 contains our empirical application. We discuss estimation, statistical
inference and we present several results. Section 5 concludes and points towards future research.
2 Notation and Deﬁnitions
In this section, we set out our basic framework and we introduce the notation and deﬁnitions that
are needed in order to establish the results in the following sections.
2.1 Set up
We consider an economy with a large (inﬁnite) number of diﬀerent households. Each household,
h, is endowed with a utility function which we denote by u(qh; ah;h). is utility function de-
pends on a (column) vector of consumed goods qh 2 Rn+, where n is the number of goods, a vec-
tor of observable household speciﬁc attributes ah, e.g. household composition, and a household
speciﬁc vector of unobservable attributes h, capturing unobserved preference heterogeneity. In
order to decide how much to consume, the household maximizes its utility function subject to a
household budget constraint,
q(p; xh; ah;h) = argmax
q
u(q; ah;h) s.t. pq  xh:
Here we denote by p 2 Rn++ a (row) vector of strict positive prices and by xh 2 Rn++ the total
household disposable income. We assume that the solution of this optimization problem gives a
system of n continuous demand function qh = q(p; xh; ah;h) which depends on the vector of
prices, the income and the household observable and unobservable attributes. We assume that the
utility function is strict quasi-concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable such that the demand
functions are well deﬁned and continuous. For a price vector pt and an expenditure level x, we
denote by (pt; x), the budget set consisting of all bundles q such that ptq  x.
We treat  as a random vector. Using F (j) to denote the conditional distribution of the
unobserved preference attributes over the population of households, we impose the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. For all income levels x and prices p,
F (jp; x; a) = F (ja):
Assumption 1 requires that the vector of unobserved attributes is independent of prices and
income, conditional on all observable attributes. is ‘independence of budget sets’ condition is
frequently used in the literature.7 If we interpret  as a vector of preference parameters, Assump-
tion 1 encompasses the idea, common in consumer demand, that preferences do not vary with
7See for example, Lewbel (2001, equation 4), Hausman andNewey (2013, Assumption 1) andBlundell, Kristensen,
and Matzkin (2011, Assumption A.1).
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prices and income. For notational convenience, we omit from now (until section 4.2) the depen-
dence on the observable attributes a, taking into account that every expression is valid conditional
on some particular value of this vector.
For the remaining part of the paper, it will be more useful to work with the indirect utility
function v(p; xh;h)which gives the maximal utility that household h can obtain at prices p and
income xh. e indirect utility function is deﬁned from the direct utility function by,
v(p; xh;h) = u(q(p; xh;h);h):
e indirect utility function is strictly increasing in the level of disposable income xh. If we invert
the indirect utility function v(p; x;h), with respect to xh, we obtain the expenditure function
e(p; uh;h) which gives the minimal outlay for household h to reach utility level uh at prices p.
Finally, using the expenditure function, we can deﬁne the money metric utility function,
(pv;pt; x
h;h)  e(pv; v(pt; xh;h);h):
emoney metric utility (pv;pt; xh;h) gives the minimal amount of expenditure that house-
hold h needs to make at prices pv to be equally well of as it would have been when facing prices
pt and income xh. e money metric utility lies at the basis of many cost of living indices. In
particular, given two price vectors pt and pv and some reference budget (p; x), the Konüs cost of
living index, describing the price increase from pt to pv, is deﬁned as,
(pv;p; x;)
(pt;p; x;)
ere are two natural choices for p, namely pt and pv. Setting p equal to the initial price pt gives
the Laspreyes-Konüs cost of living index,
(pv;pt; x;)
x
:
Setting p equal to the ﬁnal price vector pv gives the Paasche-Konüs cost of living index,
x
(pt;pv; x;)
;
Both indices can be used to describe the increase in the cost necessary to maintain the same living
standard over time. eir distributions can easily be constructed provided we know the distribu-
tion of themoneymetric utility function. emoneymetric utility also provides a cardinalisation
of the utility function in the sense that for any reference price vector p and for any two budgets
(pt; x) and (pv; y):
(p;pt; x;
h)  (p;pv; y;h) () v(pt; x;h)  v(pv; y;h):
As such, the diﬀerence in the money metric can be used as a measure for the welfare change
between two diﬀerent budgets: if (pt; x) is the old budget and (pv; y) is the new one, then the
welfare change can be measured by,
(p;pv; y;
h)  (p;pt; x;h)
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Again, there are two obvious choices for the base price vector p, namely pt or pv. e ﬁrst leads
to the concept of the equivalent variation,
EV = (pt;pv; y;
h)  x:
e second gives the compensating variation,
CV = y   (pv;pt; x;h):
Revealed preferences e analysis in the following sections depends on a a very simple revealed
preference idea. Fix a household h and consider two distinct budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y). If the
household is utility maximizing, then the following condition must hold,
If x  ptq(pv; y;h) then v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h): (1)
e reasoning behind the condition is simple, if x  ptq(pv; y;h), then the consumed
bundle q(pv; y;h) at the budget (pv; y) was also feasible when q(pt; x;h) was chosen. Given
that the household is utility maximizing and that the budget sets are distinct, it follows that
u(q(pt; x;
h);h) > u(q(pv; y;
h);h), or equivalently, v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h).
It is easy to see that condition (1) implies theWeakAxiomof Revealed Preference (see Samuel-
son (1938)), which states that for any two distinct budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y),
If x  ptq(pv; y;h) then y < pvq(pt; x;h):
3 Nonparametric bounds
In this section we show how to use basic revealed preference restrictions, in particular condition
1, together with information on the distribution of q(pt; x;) in order to establish bounds on
the distribution of the money metric utility function and the mean demand functions. As a ﬁrst
partial result, we demonstrate the possibility to obtain bounds on the proportion of households
in the economy that prefer a certain budget over another.
Observational assumptions We depart from the observational restrictions imposed by a re-
peated cross sectional household consumption dataset, where diﬀerent households face the same
prices in each cross section. is gives us a data structure that consists of a limited set of diﬀer-
ent price regimes, and for each price regime a large number of consumption bundles which are
obtained from a random sample of households in the economy. We denote by T = f1; : : : ; jT jg,
the set of cross sections. e price vector corresponding to cross section t 2 T is denoted by pt.
Given that diﬀerent households face distinct expenditure levels, it is possible to observe (or es-
timate) the distribution of the random consumption bundles q(pt; x;) for every cross sectional
price vector pt; (t 2 T ) and for any level of expenditure x. Actually, none of our results will
require us to estimate the distributions of q(pt; x;) but it will be easier to conceptualize things
if we assume that these distributions are known. Estimation will be discussed in section 3. We
assume that q(pt; x;) has a continuous density function which is strict positive on its domain.
7
Before we start, let us introduce one last piece of notation. Let A() represent a collection
of conditions involving the random vector  . We use the notation Pr(A()) as a shorthand the
following probability,
Pr(A()) =
Z
1[A()]dF ();
where 1[] is the binary indicator function which equals one if and only if the term between brack-
ets is true. Pr [A()] gives us the fraction of the households for which the statementA(h) is true.
Equivalently, it gives us the probability thatA(h) holds if we draw at random a household h from
the population.
Using this notation, we further require that there is suﬃcient variation of preferences and
demand in the population such that for any two distinct budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y),
Pr [x = ptq(pv; y;)] = 0; and
Pr [v(pt; x;) = v(pv; y;)] = 0
is will allow us to freely interchange strict and weak inequalities.
3.1 Bounds on population preferences
In this section, we show how to establish bounds on the proportion of populations that prefer
a certain budget (pt; x) over another budget (pv; y). Given the notation introduced above, this
proportion is given by,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] :
e following shows how to obtain bounds on this proportion using only information on the
distribution of q(pv; y;). Consider the fraction of households for which x  ptqh(pv; y;h).
rt;v(x; y) = Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)]
Weclaim that this number gives a lower boundon the fraction of households that prefer the budget
(pt; x) over the budget (pv; y).
Lemma 1.
rt;v(x; y)  Pr [v(pt; x;) > v(pv; y;)] :
Proof. Given that all households are rational, we know from condition 1 that for all values h of
the random vector:
If x  ptq(pv; y;h) then, v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h):
ismeans that1

x > ptq(pv; y;
h)
  1 v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h). Integrating both sides
over all values of the random vector  and using Assumption 1, we obtain,
Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)]  Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] ;
() rt;v(x; y)  Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] :
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Figure 1 illustrates the reasoning behind the Lemma in the two goods case. eﬁgure gives two
budget sets (pv; y) and (pt; x). Given budget exhaustion, consumption within each budget set is
distributed over the respective budget lines. All consumption bundles on the blue segment capture
the consumption bundles of the households that satisfy x > ptq(pv; y;h). As such, the mass of
households that consume on this line segment is equal to rt;v(x; y). What the Lemma says is that
this fraction is smaller than the proportion of households for which v(pt; x;h)  v(pv; y;h).
If this would not be the case, then there would be an individual with v(pt; x;h) < v(pv; y;h)
which consumes a bundle on the blue line segment when facing the budget (pv; y). However, this
is impossible because this consumption bundle is in the interior of the budget set (pt; x), which
means, using condition (1), that v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Given above lemma, and the fact that,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] + Pr [v(pv; y;)  v(pt; x;)] = 1;
We immediately obtain the upperbound,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)]  1  rv;t(y; x):
For both lower and upper bounds to be valid, it should be the case that for all t; v 2 T and all
expenditure levels x; y,
rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x)  1:
is condition is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference applied to our
setting (see Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999, 2002, 2004)). Hoderlein and Stoye
(2013) and Kawaguchi (2012) recently developed (among other things) a statistical test that ver-
iﬁes (for two given budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y)) whether this condition is satisﬁed. If we go back
to Figure 1, the condition states that the sum of the mass of households on the blue line segment
and the mass of households on the red line segment must be smaller than 1. If this would not
be the case, then there would be a household which is on the blue segment when the budget is
(pv; y) and on the red segment when the budget is equal to (pt; x). However, this implies that
the household violates the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (i.e. x  ptq(pv; y;h) and
y  pvq(pt; x;h)).
e condition also shows that our bounds on Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] will be tighter,
the closer rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) is to one. In particular, if the sum equals one, then
Pr [v(pt; x;) > v(pv; y;)] will be exactly identiﬁed.
ere are two potential issues that may arise. First of all, it may happen that rt;v(x; y) +
rv;t(y; x) is larger than one, in which case the bounds cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. Alter-
natively, it may happen that rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) is considerably smaller than one, in which case
the range may be to large to contain much useful information. Whether one of those problems
arises is obviously am empirical matter. However, it may nevertheless be useful to discuss each of
the issues a bit more in detail and to present some potential solutions.
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Incompatible bounds A ﬁrst problem arises if,
rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) > 1;
for some budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y). In such case, we know that there is at least one household
in the population that violates the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, hence, we should reject
individual rationality of the households in the population. In order to remedy the situation, we
see two possible solutions. A ﬁrst solution is to allow a certain fraction of the population to violate
theWeak Axiom of Revealed Preference, i.e. a certain subset of the population is considered to be
irrational. Applying this solution would amount to subtracting a certain percentage, that equals
the fraction of irrational households, from rt;v(x; y) and rv;t(y; x), thereby widening the range of
possible values for Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)].
A second solution is to relax the rationality constraints for all households simultaneously.
In revealed preference theory, such relaxation is usually conceived by using a ‘goodness–of–ﬁt’
measure. e basic idea here is that households may not ‘exactly’ pass the revealed preference
restriction but are still very close to passing them. e way to proceed is to consider an extended
version of the basic revealed preference conditions that focuses on nearly optimizing behaviour
rather than exact optimising behaviour. See also Varian (1990) for a general discussion on the use-
fulness of considering such nearly optimizing behaviour in empirical revealed preference analysis.
Here, we consider one way in which this can be accomplished. We consider an adaptation of an
early proposal of Afriat (1973) for revealed preference tests in a non-stochastic setting to our spe-
ciﬁc setting. In particular, we capture optimization error by a so-called Afriat index e 2 [0; 1].
For a given value of e, the new rationality criterion adjusts condition (1) in the following way,
If e  x  ptq(pv; y;h) then v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h):
When comparing the budget (pt; x) to another budget (pv; y) the Afriat index e reduces the ex-
penditure level x towards e  x. In other words, we now check whether behaviour is rational if
allowing the household to waste as much as (1  e) of the income x by making irrational choices.
In other words, we only require the household to prefer the bundle q(pt; x;) over the bundle
q(pv; y;) if the latter is in the budget (pt; e  x). As such, wasting/irrational behaviour can be
also be regarded as sub-optimizing behaviour, we thus verify whether behaviour is rational if we
account for an optimization error equal to (1  e). Lowering the value of ewill lead to a less strict
test. Using this Afriat index, we can construct the following probabilities,
ret (x; y) = Pr [e  x  ptq(pv; y;)] :
e number ret (x; y) is increasing in e and r
0
t;v(x; y) = 0. Given this, there will always be a value
of e 2 [0; 1] such that,
ret;v(x; y) + r
e
v;t(y; x)  1:
e analysis could then proceed by replacing rt(x; y) by the numbers re

t (x; y) where e
 is either
ﬁxed a priori or coincides with the largest number for which this inequality holds.
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Uninformative bounds A second problem arises if rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) is considerably below
1. In such cases, the range of values for Pr [v(pt; x;) > v(pv; y;)] will be too wide and, there-
fore, not very informative. An approach to tighten the bounds is to impose a stronger stochastic
revealed preference condition. In the construction of rt;v(x; y) above, we only used information
concerning the two budget sets (pt; x) and (pv; y). In some cases, however, it is possible to in-
clude information on additional budget sets to obtain tighter bounds. One such tightening relies
on the fact that for any three distinct numbers a, b and c it is always the case that,
Pr(a > c)  Pr(a > b) + Pr(b > c)  1:
e reasoning behind the inequality is simple. e probability that c is larger than b is given by
1  Pr(b > c). As such, Pr(a > b > c) is bounded from below by Pr(a  b)  (1  Pr(b > c)).
e conclusion then follows from the fact that Pr(a > c)  Pr(a > b > c). Rewriting above
condition shows that it is equivalent to the famous triangle inequality.
Pr(b > c) < Pr(b > a) + Pr(a > c):
e triangle inequality has ﬁrst been noted by Guilbaud (1953) and has been popularized by
Marschak (1960). e inequality is one of the key condition in the literature on binary probability
systems. is literature, which is closely related to the literature on stochastic revealed preference
theory, tries to characterize all collections of binary probabilities over a ﬁnite set of alternatives
that are induced by probability distributions over the family of linear orders (preference relations)
on this set.
If we apply above condition to our setting and use the previously established bounds, we obtain
that for all t; v; w 2 T and all incomes x; y; z,
Pr [v(pt; x;) > v(pv; y;)]  Pr [v(pt; x;) > v(pw; z;)] + Pr [v(pw; z;) > v(pv; y;)]  1;
 rt;w(x; z) + rw;v(z; y)  1:
In cases where rt;v(x; y) is lower than
max
w;z
frt;w(x; z) + rw;v(z; y)  1g ;
this improves the lower bound on Pr[v(pt; x;) > v(pv; y;)]. Of course this tightening of
the bounds can be iterated until no further improvements are possible. If the range is still to
wide, further tightening could still be obtained by using other, though more elaborate ‘binary
probability system’ conditions. See, for example, Fishburn (1992) for an overview of the various
kind of conditions that could be imposed. Although the triangle inequality potentially improves
the bounds, we found that for our application, it does not give any signiﬁcant improvements. e
main reason is probably that, in our application, the bounds are already quite narrow. Given this,
we abstain from implementing it in the empirical analysis.
3.2 Bounding the money metric utility
In this section, we show how to use above results to bound the distribution of the money metric
utility function (pt;p0; x0; ) for some price vectors p0 and pt corresponding to the prices of
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two cross sections in the data set and for a particular level of income x0. Let us ﬁrst focus on the
upper bounds.
Upper bounds Let us ﬁx a cross sectional price vector p0 and an income level x0. For any num-
ber  2 (0; 1) and any cross section t 2 T , let ht() solve the following condition,
 = Pr [ht()  ptq(p0; x0;)] ;
= rt;0(ht(); x0)
e value of ht(r) corresponds to the th quantile of the random variable ptq(p0; x0;). From
Lemma 1, we know that  is lower than the fraction of the households that prefer the budget
(pt; ht()) over the budget (p0; x0).
  Pr [v(pt; ht();)  v(p0; x0;)] ;
= Pr [ht()  (pt;p0; x0;)] :
e second line is obtained by inverting the indirect utility function v(pt; ht();) with respect
to its second argument. is can be done by the fact that the indirect utility function is strictly
increasing in income.
Let us denote bymt() the quantile function of (pt;p0; x0), i.e. for all  2 (0; 1)
Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  mt()] = :
en, using previously established result, we have that,
Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  mt()] =   Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  ht()] ;
() mt()  ht():
e last line uses the assumption that cumulative distribution function of (pt;p0; x;) is strictly
increasing on its support. is result shows that ht() is an upper bound on the th quantile of
the distribution of the money metric utility function. Using these upper bounds on the quantiles;
we can also derive an upper bound on the mean value of the money metric utility. LetM be the
mean of the function (pt;p0; x0;). We have that:
M =
Z 1
0
(pt;p0; x0;)dF ((pt;p0; x0;));
=
Z 1
0
mt()d 
Z 1
0
ht()d:
In practice, we compute the values of ht() for a ﬁnite grid of values 0; 1; : : : ; n with 0 = 0
and N = 1.8 is allows us to approximate this upper bound by,Z 1
0
ht()d 
NX
i=1
(n   n 1)ht():
e ﬁner the grid, the better the approximation.
8e upperbound ht(1) can be set to the minimal income such that the budget hyperplane for (pt; ht(1)) lies
above the hyperplane for (p0; x0).
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Lower bound We use a similar procedure to compute lower bounds on the quantiles. Let `t()
solve the following equality,
1   = Pr [x0 > p0q(pt; `t();)] ;
= r0;t(x0; `t())
en,
1    Pr [v(p0; x0;) > v(pt; `t();)] ;
= Pr [(pt;p0; x0;) > `t()] ;
= 1  Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  `t()]
Asbefore, letmt()be theth quantile of the distribution of themoneymetric utility(pt;p0; x0;).
We have that,
Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  mt()] =   Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  `t()] ;
() mt()  `t()
is shows that `t() is a lower bound for the quantilemt(). emeanM is then bounded from
below by the quantity
R 1
0
`t()d which can be approximated by
PN 1
n=0 `t(n)(n+1   n).9
3.3 Bounds on demand correspondences
In this section, we show how to adapt above framework in order to establish bounds on the quan-
tiles of the demand functions for unobserved, counterfactual, price regimes p0 and expenditure
levels x0, i.e. p0 does not necessarily correspond to the observed price vector of a certain cross
section.
Consider a function f : Rn+ ! R : q 7! f(q). In this section, we will provide upper bounds
on the quantiles of the distribution of the random variable f(q(p0; x0;)). e function f(q)
can encompass various interesting measures. For example, if we want to bounds the expenditure
share on one of the goods, we can use the function f(q) = 1
x0
p0;jqj , where p0;j is the price of good
j in vector p0, qj is the quantity of good j in vector q and x0 is the expenditure level.
e focus on upper bounds is not restrictive given that we can always use information on
upperbounds to construct lowerbounds. In order to see this, let  m(1   ) be the (1   )th
quantile of the variable  f(q(p0; x0;)) and let  g(1   ) be its upper bound. We then have
9e lowerbound `t(0) can be set to the maximal income such that the hyperplane for the budget set (pt; `t(0))
lies below the hyperplane for (p0; x0).
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that,
1   =
Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;))   m(1  )] dF ();

Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;))   g(1  )] dF ();
()   1 
Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;))   g(1  )] dF ();
=
Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;)) >  g(1  )] dF ();
=
Z
1 [f(q(p0; x0;))  g(1  )] dF ():
As such, we see that g(1  ) provides a lowerbound on the th quantile of f(q(p0; x0;)). For
example, we can establish a lowerbound on the th quantile of f(q) = 1
x0
p0;jqj by constructing
an upperbound on the (1  )th quantile of  1
x0
p0;jqj(=
P
i6=j
1
x0
p0;iqi   1).
For every cross section t, we previously deﬁned the value `t(1 ) that satisﬁed the following
condition,
 = Pr [x0 > p0q(pt; `t(1  );)] ;
= r0;t(x0; `t(1  )):
e value of `t() can be obtained using information on x0, p0 and the distribution of q(pt; x;)
alone, which we assumed to be known. For the next step, we use the Weak Axiom of Stochastic
Revealed Preference, which requires that,
rt;0(`t(1  ); x0) + r0;t(x0; `t(1  ))  1;
() r0;t(x0; `t(1  ))  1  rt;0(`t(1  ); x0):
Letm() be the th quantile of the distribution function of the random variable f(q(p0; x0;)).
We have that,
Pr [f(q(p0; x0;)  m()] =  = r0;t(x0; `t(1  ));
 1  rt;0(`t(1  ); x0);
= Pr [`t(1  )  ptq(p0; y0;)]
 Pr

f(q(p0; x0;))  max
q
f(q) s.t `t(1  )  ptq and p0q = x0

e last inequality follows from the fact that whenever `t(1 )  ptq(p0; y0;) holds, then
f(q(p0; x0;))  maxq f(q) s.t `t(1   )  ptq and p0q = x0 must also hold. In order to
see this, assume on the contrary that f(q(p0; x0;)) is larger than f(q) for all vectors q where
p0q = x0 and `t(1 )  ptq. en, given that p0q(p0; x0;) = x0, it must be that `t(1 ) >
ptq(p0; x0;), a contradiction.
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Above result shows that,
m()  max
q
f(q) s.t `t(1  )  ptq and p0q = x0;
for all cross sections t. In practice, we compute this right hand side for every cross section t and
then take the lowest value across all cross sections as the upper bound. If f is a linear function,
then the right hand side is a simple linear programming problem which can be solved eﬃciently.
e construction of the bounds in the simple two goods setting is illustrated in Figure 2. ere
are three budget lines corresponding to (p0; x0); (pt; `t(1 )) and (pv; `v())e incomes `t(1 
) and `v() are chosen such that the mass of households on the green line segment (where x0 >
p0q(pt; `t(1   );)) is equal to  and the mass of households on the red line segment (where
x0 > p0q(pv; `v();)) is equal to (1  ).
e quantity q2 is the maximum value of good 2 that corresponds to a bundle on the budget
(p0; x0) (where p0q = x0) and `t()  ptq. From the result above, we know that this value
gives an upperbound on the th quantile of the distribution of q2(p0; x0;). Given that there
are only two goods, this upperbound immediately gives a lowerbound on the (1   )th quantile
of q1(p0; x0;), given by q1. Similarly, q1 gives an upperbound on the (1   )th quantile of
q1(p0; x0;), while q2 gives a lowerbound on the th quantile of q2(p0; x0;). As such, the th
quantile of q2(p0; x0;) is bounded by the quantities q2 and q2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Using the bounds on the quantiles of the demand functions, we can compute bounds on themean
of the demand function by using a similar procedure as for the money metric utility function.
4 Application
In this section, we discuss the empirical implementation of the theoretical bounds that were es-
tablished in the previous section. We ﬁrst present our estimation procedure for the measures
rt;v(x; y), `t() and ht(). Next, we discuss a modiﬁcation of the estimator with better ﬁnite
sample properties and we show how we control for observed heterogeneity and endogeneity of
the total expenditures. We also brieﬂy discuss the issue of statistical inference on bounds. Finally,
we present some empirical results.
4.1 Estimation procedure
e construction of the bounds in the previous section assumed that we know the distribution of
the variables q(pt; x;) for every cross sectional price pt and every income level x. Given these
distributions it easy to obtain the quantities rt;v(x; y) = Pr [x > ptq(pv; y;)], which form the
main building blocks for our bounds. In practice, however, these probabilities need to be esti-
mated. We propose a kernel estimator. For the estimation of the numbers `t() and ht() which
are used as bounds for the money metric utility function and the construction for the bounds on
the demand functions we propose a plug-in estimator.
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Consider the vth cross section, v 2 T . Assume that this cross section contains a sample of n
observed household demand bundles fQi;vgin where i corresponds to a particular observation.
We denote by fXi;vgin the corresponding expenditure levels (Xi;v = pvQi;v). We assume that
the sample fQi;vgiN is i.i.d drawn from the random vector qv. We denote by xv the random
variable pvqv. We denote by (:) the distribution function of xv.
Consider the value rt;v(x; y) = Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)]. is value corresponds to the cdf of
the random variable ptqv, conditional on the value xv = y,
rt;v(x; y) =
Z
1 [x  ptq(pv; y;)] dF ();
=
Z
1 [x  ptqv] dF (qvjxv = y);
where F (qvjxv = y) is the conditional cdf of qv given the level of expenditure xv = y. is
expression is equal to the conditional mean of the indicator function 1 [x  ptqv],Z
1 [x  ptqv] dF (qvjxv = y) = E f1 [x  ptqv  0] jxv = yg :
We can express this conditional mean in the following way,
1 [x  ptQi;v  0] = g(ln(Xi;v)) + "i;v;
where E("i;vjxv = y) = 0 for all values of y. e quantity of interest is given by the value of
g(ln(y)). A straightforward Nadaraya-Watson Kernel estimator is given by,
r^t;v(x; y) =
1
nh
Pn
i=1 1 [x  ptQi;v] k

ln(Xi;v) ln(y)
h

1
nh
Pn
i=1 k

ln(Xi;v) ln(y)
h
 :
where h is the bandwidth and k (:) is a symmetric Kernel function that satisﬁes
R
k(v)dv = 1 andR
vk(v)dv = 0.10 We take the log of expenditure as metric.
If for n ! 1, h ! 0 and nh ! 1, then the estimator r^t;v(x; y) consistently estimates
rt;v(x; y). If in addition (i)(y) > 0, (ii) rt;v(x; y) 2 (0; 1), (iii) the functions(:) and rt;v(:; :) are
suﬃciently smooth11 and (iv) nh7 ! 0 then the estimator r^t;v(x; y) has the following asymptotic
distribution (see, for example Li and Racine (2007)).
p
nh
1
V (x; y)1=2
[r^t;v(x; y)  rt;v(x; y) B(x; y)]! N(0; 1):
where B(x; y) = h22
h
1
2
@2rt;v(x;y)
@y2
+ @rt;v(x;y)
@y
@(y)
@y
1
(y)
i
is the asymptotic bias and V (x; y) =
rt;v(x; y) [1  rt;v(x; y)]=(y) is the asymptotic variance. Here 2 =
R
v2k(v)dv and  =
10In practice, we use the Gaussian kernel.
11e exact condition is that (y) and rt;v(x; y) have continuous second order derivatives with respect to y.
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R
k(v)2dv. As usual with nonparametric kernel estimators, the bias, B(y; x), does not disap-
pear asymptotically when using the optimal bandwidth h = O(n1=5). One possible solution is to
undersmooth.
e estimates for ht() and `t() are computed as the solution to the following conditions,
 = r^t;0(h^t(); x0);
1   = r^0;t(x0; ^`t()):
is is done using standard binary search algorithms. In order for this algorithm to work, we
assume that r^0;t(x0; ^`t()) is decreasing in ^`t(). is assumption is (asymptotically) valid if all
goods are normal (i.e. all demand functions are increasing in income).12
e estimator h^() is equivalent to a conditional quantile kernel estimator . is estimator is
consistent for ht() as long as for n!1, h! 0 and nh!1. If rt;v(ht(); x0) is continuously
diﬀerentiable in ht(), then under the same conditions as for the estimator r^t;v(x; y), it can be
shown that its asymptotic distribution is given by (see, for example Li and Racine (2007, section
6.3)),
p
nh
 rt;0(ht();x0)@ht() 
V (ht(); x0)1=2
0@h^t()  ht()  B(ht(); x0)@rt;0(ht();x0)@ht() 
1A!d N(0; 1):
Using a proof similar to the one of Cai (2002, eorem 2), we show in the appendix that if for
n ! 1, h ! 0 and nh ! 1, the estimator ^`t() is consistent for `t() and that under some
additional conditions its asymptotic distribution is given by,13
p
nh
 r0;t(x0;`t())@`t() 
V (x0; `t())1=2
0@^`
t()  `t() + B(x0; `t())@r0;t(x0;`t())@`t() 
1A!d N(0; 1):
eestimates for the bounds on the demand functions are computed by substituting the estimated
values ^`t() for the values of `t() in the linear programming problems. As such, the resulting
estimators are determined as the minimum over a ﬁnite set of values which are themselves the
solution of a linear maximization problem that contain the estimates ^`t() as a parameter. Al-
though this estimator is consistent, by the continuous mapping theorem, we are unaware of any
results that discusses the asymptotic distribution of this (or similarly constructed) estimator.
4.2 Adjustments
Wemake several adjustments to the estimator r^t;v(x; y) presented above.
12See also Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003) for a similar assumption.
13In particular, we require that rt;v(x0; `t()) has strict negative partial derivative with respect to `t() and thatp
nh3 !1.
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Boundary problems e estimator r^t;v(x; y) has the undesirable property that it may give an
estimates strictly between zero and one even when the budget sets (pt; xt) and (pv; xv) do not
intersect. In order to see this, assume that x > ptq for all q for which pvq = y, i.e. the budget set
deﬁned by price income (pt; x) lies strictly above the budget deﬁned by (pv; y). In this setting,
it may still be the case that the indicator function 1 [x  ptQi;v] is zero for some observations
i. From this, it follows that the Kernel estimator will also be strictly below one although the true
value of t;v(x; y) is clearly equal to one.
In order to avoid this boundary problem, we reformulate the probability to be estimated in the
following way,Z
1 [x  ptqv] dF (qvjxv = y) =
Z
1 [xpvsv  ptysv] dF (svjxv = y);
=
Z
1 [(xpv   ypt) sv  0] dF (svjxv = y);
Where sv is the random vector of consumption shares, sv = qv=xv, and we used the identity
pvsv = 1 and the fact that, that conditional on xv = y, qv = ysv. If we denote the realizations of
sv by Sv;i = Qv;i=Xv;i, we can estimate this using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator,
1
nh
Pn
i=1 1 [(xpv   ypt)Si;v  0] k

ln(Xi;v) ln(y)
h

1
nh
Pn
i=1 k

ln(Xi;v) ln(y)
h
 :
Although this estimator could still over or underestimate the true proportion slightly, the bias
should be considerably less. Also, the estimator has the advantage that it is either zero or one if
the two budget lines do not intersect. In order to see this, assume that the two budgets do not
intersect, i.e. there is no bundle q such that
ptq = x and,
pvq = y
Now, assume that the estimator is somewhere strictly between zero and one. ismeans that there
exist observations i and j such that:
(xpv   ypt) si;v < 0 and,
(xpv   ypt) sj;v  0
As both le hand sides are continuous functions of the shares vector vector, we can use the inter-
mediate value function and show the existence of a vector s such that:
(xpv   ypt) s = 0;
() pv
y
s =
pt
x
s
If we deﬁne  = y
pvs
= x
pts
, and let ~q = s, we have that pt~q = x and pv~q = y, a contradiction.
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Semiparametric adjustment We also adjust the kernel estimator r^t;v(x; y) by including a semi-
parametric speciﬁcation. We have two reasons to do this. First of all, given the data limitations,
we would like to allow our estimator to depend on the vector of unobserved covariates, a, without
fully conditioning on each of its values. Next, we need to take into account the fact that total
expenditures are probably endogenous. We follow Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008), and
consider the following semiparametric modiﬁcation,
1 [(xpt   ypv)Si;v  0] = g(ln(Xi;v)  (A0i;v)) +A0i;v + "i;v;
whereAi;v be the observed household composition of observation i in cross section v. e func-
tion (A0i;v)) can be interpreted as the log of a general equivalence scale for household i, and
A0i;v, documents the way in which observable demographic diﬀerences across households im-
pacts the le hand side. Similar to Blundell et al. (2008) we use an estimate of the general equiva-
lence scale (A0i;v)) taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) scales.
In order to control for the endogeneity of the expenditure level xv, Blundell, Browning, and
Crawford (2008) suggest to use a control function approach based on the two step semiparametric
estimator (this is a linearised version of the procedure set out by Newey, Powell, and Vella (1999)).
In a ﬁrst step, we obtain the residuals from a regression of the log of total expenditure on all
exogenous variables in the model and on an excluded instrument. We take the log of (equivalent)
labour income as an instrument. In the second step, we conduct a semiparametric regression of
1 [(xpt   ypv)Si;v  0] on g(ln(Xi;v)   (A0i;v)), A0i;v and v^i;v, where v^i;v are the residuals
from this ﬁrst stage regression.
4.3 Inference on bounds
emethodology outlined in section 3 provides nonparametric bounds on various parameters of
interest (e.g. the quantiles of themoneymetric utility). In the previous section, we have also shown
how these bounds can be consistently estimated. However, given that the bounds are based on
ﬁnite sample estimates, we are confronted with the issue of statistical inference, in particular, the
construction of conﬁdence intervals. Given that our estimates only provide bounds, this problem
ﬁts in the literature that deals with the construction of conﬁdence intervals for partially identiﬁed
estimators. We refer to the several recent papers by Imbens and Manski (2004); Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer (2007); Stoye (2009); Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) and in particu-
lar to the recent paper of Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) who consider the problem of constructing
conﬁdence intervals in a setting which is similar to ours.
Given that the main contribution of this paper is not on statistical inference, we will only
brieﬂy discuss this issue and instead refer to above mentioned papers for more details on how to
construct conﬁdence intervals in our setting. As an example of how such construction could look
like, consider the case of the quantile mt() which gives the the quantile of the money metric
utility (pt; p0; x0;). Using the results above, we know that
mt() 2 0 = [`t();ht()]
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In practice, however, we only have estimates ^`t() and h^t(). ere are two kinds of intervals that
can be constructed. e ﬁrst is a conﬁdence interval for the interval0, i.e. a set CI such that,
lim
nh!1
Pr (0  CI) = :
A second kind of interval, CIm , constructs an interval for the quantile mt() itself in the sense
that,
lim
nh!1
Pr (mt() 2 CIm ) = :
One important results from the literature (see, for example, Imbens and Manski (2004)) is that,
lim
nh!1
Pr (mt() 2 CI)  lim
nh!1
Pr (mt() 2 CIm ) = 
As such, any conﬁdence set for the interval, 0, is also a (conservative) conﬁdence interval for
the parameter mt(). An interval CI can be constructed in the following way, provided that
the estimates of the upper and lower bounds are asymptotically normally distributed with zero
asymptotic bias.14 Let [^`t()  c^lpnh ; ^`t()+ c blpnh ] be an asymptotic % conﬁdence interval for the
lowerbound `t() and let [h^t()   cchpnh ; h^t() + cchpnh ] be an asymptotic % conﬁdence interval
for the upperbound ht(), where bl andch are consistent estimates of the standard errors of the
asymptotic distribution of the lower and upper bound and where c is chosen such that,
(c)  ( c) = ;
where (:) is the standard normal probability distribution. en, using a simple Bonferroni ar-
gument, we know that, 
^`
t()  c blp
nh
; h^t() +
cchp
nh

;
is a conservative asymptotic % conﬁdence interval for 0. e standard deviations bl andch
could be estimated by using an asymptotic consistent plug-in estimator when the asymptotic dis-
tribution is analytically available, or from a bootstrap procedure, provided its asymptotical valid-
ity.
4.4 Data Description
We illustrate our approach by using a data sample from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
a repeated cross section. We use data on consumption decisions by US households from 1994 to
2007 (14 years). It is important to note that the consumer expenditures are derived from the di-
ary survey (and not from the interview data). e diary data seem well-suited for (static) demand
analysis. First of all, given that we focus on non-durable consumption, which is customary in static
14For kernel estimators, we could get the bias to converge to zero by undersmoothing.
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demand analysis, information on the purchase of big, durable items is unnecessary. Second, for
non-durable commodities, the diary survey invites respondents to indicate their consumption in
a two-week period. Because this period is relatively short, respondents should be able to recall
their expenditures. We follow Blundell et al. (2008) by focussing our attention to three broad ex-
penditure categories, namely, food, other non-durables and services.15 As the diary survey reports
expenditures on a two-week basis, we convert these to yearly equivalents. Converting two-week
expenditures to yearly data poses an important problem of seasonality. erefore, we deseason-
alise using a dummy regression approach. Speciﬁcally, the expenditures on each category (re-
ported for two weeks) are regressed on month dummies. Residuals from this regression (which
can be interpreted as the variation in expenditures which can not be explained by seasonality or
by months) are added to the mean expenditures for each category in order to construct deseason-
alized expenditures. Observations with negative total expenditures are dropped. As mentioned
above, we also take into account that variation in expenditures can be driven by the household
composition, e.g. the number of adults or the number of kids living in the family. erefore, we
deﬂate total expenditures as well as total income by an OECD equivalence scale.
For the empirical analysis, we restrict attention to (i) households who have completed the two-
week diary, (ii) households who are not living in student housing, (iii) households who are vehicle
owners (to include fuel expenses), (iv) households where both members works at least 17 hours,
(v) households where both members are not self-employed, (vi) households where the age of the
reference person is at least 21 and ﬁnally we restrict attention to (vii) households that consist of a
husband, a wife and possibly children. As a ﬁnal step we also remove some outlier observations.
In particular, we removed observations for which rescaled total expenditures are not within 3
standard deviations from the mean, rescaled total expenditures are among the 5 per cent lowest
or 5 per cent highest expenditures, expenditure shares on each category are not within 3 standard
deviations from the mean or expenditure shares are close to 0. On average, we are le with 2163
observations per cross-section with a minimum of 1775 observations in 1994 and a maximum of
2379 observations in 2007. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the mean consumption shares of the
three goods over the considered periods. Price information is obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
[Figure 3 about here.]
4.5 Empirical results
In this section, we provide the results of several exercises. Due to limited space, we need to restrict
our analysis to some particular base years and some reference income levels. Additional results
are available from the authors upon request.
15See Appendix B for a list of the diﬀerent goods used for the construction of the aggregates.
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Bounds on the mean cost of living Let us ﬁrst show how our bounds perform with respect to
the computation of the mean of the Laspreyes-Konüs cost of living index,Z
(pt;p0; x0;)
x0
dF () =
1
x0
Z
(pt;p0; x0;)dF ():
eLaspreyes-Konüs price indexmeasures the income that onewould need, relative to the income
in period 0, in order to be as equally good of as in the initial period. We take 1994 as the reference
year which means that p0 corresponds to the price vector in the year 1994. We choose x0 as the
(OECD equivalence scale deﬂated) median expenditure level in 1994. e bounds on the cost
of living that we obtain using our procedure are given in the last column of Table 1. e table
also reports values for various other prices indices like the Laspreyes (L), the Paasche (P) and the
Tornqvist price index (T). We also provide information on three other nonparametric bounds.
e ﬁrst are the Lerner bounds which are obtained from the fact that:
min
j

pt;j
p0;j

 (pt;p0; x0)
x0
 max
j

pt;j
p0;j

:
e bounds by (Pollak, 1971) improve upon this by replacing the upper bound by the Laspreyes
price index.
min
j

pt;j
p0;j

 (pt;p0; x0)
x0
 ptq0
x0
:
e second to last column gives the bounds that are obtained by using the procedure set out
by Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003). is method ﬁrst estimates nonparametric Engel
curves and subsequently uses these estimates in combinationwith revealed preference restrictions
to establish nonparametric bounds. We would like to emphasize that there is a clear conceptual
diﬀerence between the bounds of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003), and ours. eir pro-
cedure provides bounds on the cost of living that corresponds to some kind of ‘representative
individual’ whose demand functions equal the mean demand functions over the population. Our
bounds, on the other hand, correspond to bounds of the mean cost of living over all households
within the population. Although it is reassuring to see that both procedures give very similar
results, this does not have to be the case in general.
[Table 1 about here.]
Distribution of the price and quantity indices Let us now have a look a the bounds on the
quantiles of this cost of living index over the population. Figure 4 provides bounds on the quantiles
of the Laspreyes-Konüs cost of living index, for the 10th (blue), 30th (red), 50th(black), 70th
(red) and 90th (blue) percentile. Upper and lower bounds on a particular quantiles are presented
by the same colour. Again the base year is 1994 and the reference income is given by the median
expenditure level in this year. In general, we see that the bounds on the quantiles are quire narrow.
e width of the distribution for a particular year depends to a large extent on the diﬀerence
in relative slopes between the base year (p0=x0) and the evaluation year (pt=xt) e closer the
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relative prices, the narrower the diﬀerence between the largest and smallest cost of living for the
particular year. e reason is that the distribution is naturally bounded between theminimumand
maximum values of y=x0 for which the budget hyperplanes corresponding to (pt; y) and (p0; x0)
do not intersect. We see that the distribution is the narrowest in the year 2000 and the widest
in the year 2002 giving diﬀerences in cost of living up to more than 5 percentage points between
the 10th and 90th percentile. One noticeable feature about the ﬁgure is that there seems to be
a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the population although the width of the distribution
remains more or less constant for the latter 5 years.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Distribution of the compensating variation Figure 5 shows the distribution of the compensat-
ing variation,
xt   (pt;p0; x0;)
Here, x0 is taken to be the median income in 2000 and xt is the median income in cross section
t. is compensating variation gives the diﬀerence between the median income in year t and the
minimum income that would be necessary in order to obtain the welfare level at budget (p0; x0).
Values above zero indicate a welfare gain for a household at themedian income in year t compared
to a household at the median income in year 1994. We see that all quantiles are below zero for
the years 1994-1999 and 2001 and quantiles are above zero for the years 2005-2007. Once again,
there seems to be quite a lot of heterogeneity present in the population. For many years, the range
between the 10th and 90th percentile is around $400 per year which is substantial.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6 gives another illustration of the kind of questions that can be answered giving the frame-
work in this paper. e ﬁgure gives bounds on the average of the Laspreyes-Konüs cost of living
for diﬀerent starting quantiles, Z
(pt;p0; x0;i;)
x0;i
dF ():
Here, x0;i represents the income at the ith quantile of the income distribution in 1994, p0 are the
prices in 1994 and pt is the price vector for 2007. e ﬁgure gives an idea of the average price
increase (over the heterogeneous population) for households starting at diﬀerent quantiles of the
income distribution in 1994. On average one sees an increase over the quantiles, whichmeans that
(on average) the cost of living for households starting at the lower end of the incomedistribution in
1994 was lower than for household starting at the higher end of the income distribution. In other
words, the households that started at the lower end of the income distribution had (on average)
a lower increase in the cost of living. Also, notice that the upper bound for the lowest quantile is
below the lower bound for the upper quantile. is shows that the average cost of living values
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (although the numbers are not very distinct in absolute terms).
[Figure 6 about here.]
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Bounds on the demand functions As a last exercise, let us have a look at the bounds on the
demanded consumption shares for counterfactual price regimes. To keep focus, we restrict our-
selves to the computation of bounds for the own price eﬀect for the food aggregate. We take as
reference year 2001 as this year had a price vector which was closest to the average price vector
over all considered periods. We ﬁx the expenditure level at the median level in 2001 and we let
the price for food, p2001;j range from 0.94 times the price in 2001 until 1.06 times its price. We
keep the prices of all other goods ﬁxed at the 2001 level. Figure 7 presents the results for three
quantiles, the 10th (in black) the median (in red) and the 90th (in blue). Again we see a lot of
heterogeneity in the demand curves over the population although the price responses look very
similar across the three quantiles.
[Figure 7 about here.]
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we used elementary revealed preference techniques together with nonparametric
estimation techniques in order to bound the distribution of the money metric utility and the de-
mand functions over a population of heterogeneous households. Our methodology has two at-
tractive features. First of all, the results are entirely nonparametric which means that they are not
dependent on any functional form imposed on the underlying utility functions. Second, we im-
pose minimal conditions on the structure of the individual, unobserved, heterogeneity. When we
apply our techniques to data from the US consumer expenditure survey, we ﬁnd that our method
generates narrow and informative bounds on the quantiles of the money metric utility function.
Our results also demonstrates that individual heterogeneity creates considerable variation in wel-
fare between households in the population (conditional for the same level of expenditure). We
also demonstrate how our results can be used to obtain informative bounds on the distribution of
the demand functions in counterfactual price-income situations.
ere are several avenues for follow up research. First of all, we only brieﬂy touched upon
the highly relevant topic of statistical inference. However, given that our data is obtained from
a random sample, measurement error and small sample bias inﬂuence our bounds, and statisti-
cal inference becomes highly relevant. Next, it would be interesting to see how our methodology
extends to discrete choice settings. One way to incorporate discrete choices would be consider a
setting where individuals make discrete choices in addition to continuous choices. In fact, many
of the results from this paper readily extend to this setting. Alternatively one could imagine a
setting where all choices are discrete (see Manski (2007) and Sher, il Kim, Fox, and Patrick (2011)
for a theoretical account of stochastic revealed preferences recovery in such setting). It would
be interesting to look how the methodology developed in this paper transfers to such discrete
choice setting. Finally, it would also be interesting to see how other (more strict) stochastic re-
vealed preference axioms that explicitly take into account transitivity may even further improve
our bounds.
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A proof of consistency and asymptotic normality of l^t()
In this appendix we demonstrate the consistency and asymptotic normality of ^`t(). e proofs
are similar to Cai (2002). For ease of notation, we write ^`for ^`t() and ` for `t(). We ﬁrst show
that ^`!P `.
Consistency Given that r^t;v(x; y)!P rt;v(x; y) and both functions aremonotone and bounded
in y and bounded, it follows from Tucker (1967, eorem 1) that,
sup
y
jr^t;v(x; y)  rt;v(x; y)j !P 0:
For any " > 0, set,
(") = minf   rt;v(x; `+ "); rt;v(x; `  ")  g > 0:
is uses the fact that rt;v(x; y) is strictly decreasing in y at (x; y).
Lemma 2. If j`  ^`j  " then jrt;v(x; ^`)  r^t;v(x; ^`)j  (").
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that `  ^`. enwe have that ^` ` ". is implies rt;v(x; ^`)  rt;v(x; ` ").
As such,
rt;v(x; ^`)  r^t;v(x; ^`)  rt;v(x; `  ")    ("):
is shows that jrt;v(x; ^`)  r^t;v(x; ^`)j  (").
If ` < ^`we have that ^`> `+ " and consequentially, rt;v(x; ^`)  rt;v(x; `+ "). As such,
r^t;v(x; ^`)  rt;v(x; ^`)     rt;v(x; `+ ")  ("):
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Again, we see that jrt;v(x; ^`)  r^t;v(x; ^`)j  ("). As such, we see that for every " > 0,
Pr

j`  ^`j  "

 Pr

jr^t;v(x; ^`)  rt;v(x; ^`)j  (")

:
As the right hand side goes to zero by consistency of r^t;v(x; y) for n!1, h! 0 and nh!1,
the le hand side also goes to zero. Given this, we see that ^`!P `.
Asymptotic normality Let us now look at the asymptotic distribution of ^`n. We know that
r^t;v(x; y) has the following limiting distribution,
p
nh
V (x; y)1=2
(r^t;v(x; y)  rt;v(x; y) B(x; y))! N (0; 1);
Where B(x; y) = O(h2) is the asymptotic bias and V (x; y) is the asymptotic variance. We ﬁrst
consider two lemma’s.
Lemma 3. If "n=h = o(1), then,
r^t;v(x; y + "n)  r^t;v(x; y) = @rt;v(x; y)
@y
"n + oP ("n) + oP (h
2) + oP ((nh)
 1=2):
Proof. e proof involves straightforward but long and tedious computation. As such, it is avail-
able upon request.
Lemma 4. Fix a number v <1 and deĕne "n =
vV (x;y)1=2p
nh
 B(x;y)
@rt;v(x; y)
@y

. en if h! 0, nh3 !1 and
nh5 = O(1), then,
1. "n=h = o(1).
2.
p
nh o("n) = o(1).
Proof. Easy.
Now we are ready to demonstrate the following,
p
nh
 rt;v(x;`)@` 
V (x; `)1=2
0@^`
n   `+ B(x; `)@rt;v(x;`)@` 
1A!d N(0; 1):
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Proof. Denote by (v) is the normal cumulative distribution function, then
Pr
0@(nh)1=2
@rt;v(x;`)@` 
V (x; `)1=2
0@^`
n   `+ B(x; `)@rt;v(x;`)@` 
1A  v
1A ;
= Pr
0@^`
n   ` 
vV (x;`)1=2
(nh)1=2
 B(x; `)@rt;v(x;`)@` 
1A ;
= Pr

^`
n   `  "n

;
= Pr

^`
n  "n + `

;
= Pr

r^t;v(x; ^`n)  r^t;v(x; `+ "n)

;
= Pr

r^t;v(x; ^`n)  r^t;v(x; `) + @rt;v(x; `)
@`
"n + oP ("n) + oP (h
2) + oP ((nh)
 1=2

;
= Pr

r^t;v(x; ^`n)  r^t;v(x; `)   
@rt;v(x; `)@`
 "n + oP ("n) + op(h2) + op((nh) 1=2) ;
 Pr

(nh)1=2
1
V (x; y)1=2

r^t;v(x; `)  r^t;v(x; ^`n) B(x; `)

  v

= Pr

(nh) 1=2
1
V (x; y)1=2
(r^t;v(x; `)  rt;v(x; `) B(x; `))   v

!d (v):
B Construction of aggregates
Food is an aggregate of cereals, bakery products, beef, pork, poultry, seafood, other meat, eggs,
milk products, other dairy products, fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, processed fruit, processed veg-
etables, sweets, fat and oils, non-alcoholic beverages, prepared food, snacks and condiments.
Other non-durables contain expenditures on alcohol consumption, tobacco, clothes (for all
household members), footwear, reading material, stationery, school supplies, cleaning products,
garden supplies, household textile, non-durable housewares, medical products, personal care
products, audio-visual equipment, recreational goods, pet goods and vehicle expenses.
Services include utilities, media bills, repair services, insurance, postal services, gasoline, vehi-
cle expenses (services), public transportation, medical care services, personal care services, recre-
ational services, home services, rental services, membership fees, school fees, other fees, pet ser-
vices and care services.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Lemma 1
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Figure 2: Illustration of the construction of the bounds
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Figure 3: Evolution of average consumption shares
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Figure 4: Distribution of the cost of living
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Figure 5: Distribution of compensating variation, baseyear 2000
.
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Figure 6: Change in mean cost of living 1994-2007 for diﬀerent starting quantiles of income
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Figure 7: Bounds on the demand shares
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Table 1: Bounds on the mean Laspreyes Konüs cost of living index
Price indices Nonparametric Bounds
year L P T Lerner Pollak BBC bounds
1994 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 [1.0000, 1.0000] [1.0000, 1.0000] [1.0000, 1.0000] [1.0000 1.0000]
1995 1.0276 1.0271 1.0269 [1.0086, 1.0357] [1.0086, 1.0276] [1.0268, 1.0270] [1.0257 1.0284]
1996 1.0606 1.0597 1.0594 [1.0358, 1.0708] [1.0358, 1.0606] [1.0592, 1.0595] [1.0575 1.0614]
1997 1.0863 1.0846 1.0845 [1.1019, 1.0972] [1.1019, 1.0863] [1.0845, 1.0845] [1.0820 1.0877]
1998 1.0977 1.0929 1.0937 [1.0327, 1.1236] [1.0327, 1.0977] [1.0946, 1.0929] [1.0889 1.1000]
1999 1.1246 1.1213 1.1216 [1.0709, 1.1470] [1.0709, 1.1246] [1.1221, 1.1212] [1.1173 1.1267]
2000 1.1717 1.1713 1.1713 [1.1886, 1.1652] [1.1886, 1.1717] [1.1714, 1.1711] [1.1691 1.1739]
2001 1.2070 1.2048 1.2051 [1.1456, 1.2437] [1.1456, 1.2070] [1.2054, 1.2051] [1.2003 1.2114]
2002 1.2212 1.2157 1.2171 [1.1301, 1.2742] [1.1301, 1.2212] [1.2186, 1.2169] [1.2103 1.2274]
2003 1.2624 1.2568 1.2585 [1.1659, 1.3263] [1.1659, 1.2624 [1.2605, 1.2583] [1.2528 1.2704]
2004 1.3100 1.3070 1.3076 [1.2243, 1.3679] [1.2243, 1.3100] [1.3084, 1.3078] [1.3020 1.3172]
2005 1.3669 1.3699 1.3676 [1.3115, 1.4247] [1.3115, 1.3669] [1.3680, 1.3704] [1.3659 1.3754]
2006 1.4184 1.4208 1.4193 [1.3400, 1.4839] [1.3400, 1.4184] [1.4215, 1.4233] [1.4166 1.4287]
2007 1.4658 1.4688 1.4684 [1.3966, 1.5276] [1.3966, 1.4658] [1.4683, 1.4694] [1.4649 1.4755]
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